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SUPREME COURT RAMIFICATIONS
A RETURN TO TECHNICAL
PLEADINGS? - SCHIAVONE v.
FORTUNE
The primary purpose of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure'
is to always assist, rather than deter, the disposition of litigation
on the merits.' Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c) furthers this
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were enacted by the Supreme Court under the
authority granted to it by the Rules Enabling Act of 1934, ch. 651, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified
as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1976)). The Act gave the Supreme Court "the power to
prescribe, by general rules, for district courts . . . the practice and procedure in civil ac-
tions at law," provided, however, that the "rules shall neither abridge, enlarge, nor modify
the substantive rights of any litigant." Id.; see Note, Erie R.R. v. Tompkins and the Federal
Rules, 62 HARv. L. REV. 1030, 1030-31 (1949).
Prior to the Rules Enabling Act, the civil procedure in the district courts was divided
into separate practices for actions at law and suits in equity. See 2 J. MoORE, MooRE's FED-
ERAL PRACrICE 1 1.02 [1] (2d ed. 1985). Actions at law were mainly governed by the Con-
formity Act of 1872 which required that a federal district court apply "as near as may be"
the procedure governing actions at law in the state in which the federal district court was
held. Id.; see Conformity Act, 17 Stat. 197 (1872). Suits in equity were mainly governed by
the Equity Rules of 1912. 37 Stat. 464 (1912).
2 3 J. MOORE, MooRE's FEDERAL PRAGCTME 15.02[1] (2d ed. 1985).
Rule I provides that the Rules "shall be construed to secure the just, speedy and inex-
pensive determination of every action." Id. Rule 8(f) states the canon of construction: "All
pleadings shall be construed as to do substantial justice." Id. Furthermore, Rule 61 states in
unmistakable terms that non-prejudicial error must be disregarded. Id.; see Conley v. Gib-
son, 355 U.S. 41, 48 (1957). "The Federal Rules reject the approach that pleading is a
game of skill in which one misstep by counsel may be decisive to the outcome and accept
the principle that the purpose of pleading is to facilitate a proper decision on the merits."
Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 48 (1957). In Maty v. Grasselli Chemical Co., 303 U.S. 197,
200-01 (1938), the Court stated that "[p]leadings are intended to serve as a means of arriv-
ing at fair and just settlements of controversies between litigants. They should not raise
barriers which prevent the achievement of that end." Id. See generally J. MOORE, supra, at
15.02[ 1] (pleadings are not an end in themselves, but are only the means to a proper pres-
entation of a case). The importance of pleadings ought to be solely in their effectiveness as
a means to reach a just result. See Comment, Amendment of the Pleadings After the Statute of
Limitations Has Run, 4 Mo. L. REV. 49 (1939). An overly technical approach only obstructs
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
objective by allowing an amended pleading to relate back to the
date of the original pleading for statute of limitations purposes.3
However, this rule sometimes conflicts with the primary purpose
justice. Id. at 51.
The courts have liberally construed the rules so as to maintain their spirit. See, e.g.,
Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962) (refusal to grant leave to amend without justifia-
ble reason is abuse of discretion). In Foman, the Court stated that to avoid a decision on the
merits because of a mere technicality is entirely contrary to the spirit of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure. Id. at 181. The Court also acknowledged that "It he Rules themselves
provide that they are to be construed 'to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determi-
nation of every action.' " Id. at 182 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 1); see also Beacon Theatres v.
Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 507 (1959) (liberal construction of a pleading is in line with Fed-
eral Rule 8). The liberality of the federal procedure rules is in accord with many state
codes. See J. MooRE, supra, at 1 1.13[ 11; see, e.g.. N.Y. CIv. PRtcA L. & R. § 104 (McKinney
1972) ("The civil practice laws and rules shall be liberally construed to secure the just,
speedy and inexpensive determination of every civil judicial proceeding.").
' See FED. R. Crv. P. 15(c). Concerning the relation back of an amended pleading chang-
ing the defendant, Rule 15(c) provides:
An amendment changing the party against whom a claim is asserted relates back if
the foregoing provision is satisfied and, within the period provided by law for com-
mencing the action against the party to be brought in by amendment, that party (1)
has received such notice of the institution of the action that the party will not be
prejudiced in maintaining a defense on the merits, and (2) knew or should have
known that, but for a mistake concerning the identity of the proper party, the action
would have been brought against the party.
Id. Rule 15(c) was amended on March 2, 1987, but the changes were of a technical nature
only and did not affect the previous case law. See 55 U.S.L.W. 4269.
Prior to the 1966 amendments of Rule 15(c), the general rule was that amendments
which substituted or added new parties would not relate back. See J. MOORE, supra note 2,
at 15.1514.-I. Some courts strictly adhered to the general rule, reasoning that if an
amendment were allowed to relate back, the purpose of the statute of limitations would be
defeated. Id.; see, e.g., Union Pac. Ry. v. Wyler, 158 U.S. 285, 298 (1895) (amendment to
change from negligence to violation of state statute barred by statute of limitations). Many
courts, however, in the interest of justice, permitted the relation back of amendments
changing parties. J. MOORE, supra note 2, at 1 15.15[4.-!]; see, e.g., Wedgeworth v.
Fibreboard Corp., 706 F.2d 541 (5th Cir. 1983) (amendment adding defendant's insurance
company permitted); McDonald v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 27 F.R.D. 442 (W.D. Pa. 1961)(amendment to substitute manufacturer for distributor allowed where manufacturer had
notice of action); Adams v. Beland Realty Corp., 187 F. Supp. 680 (E.D.N.Y. 1960)
(amendment substituting partnership for corporation should be allowed where corporation
was dissolved and its assets transferred to partnership). These courts examined the facts of
each case to ascertain whether allowance of such amendment would be inconsistent with
the notice requirements inherent in the statutes of limitations. Id.; see, e.g., Shapiro v. Para-
mount Film Distrib. Co., 274 F.2d 743 (3d Cir. 1960) (amendment to correct corporation
name related back); Grooms v. Greyhound Corp., 287 F.2d 95 (6th Cir. 1961) (amendment
to correct misnomer allowed to relate back). But see Lomax v. United States, 155 F. Supp.
354 (E.D. Pa. 1957) (amendment to correct name not allowed to relate back).
For Rule 15(c) to apply, Rule 15(a) must be complied with. See Yorden v. Flaste, 374 F.
Supp. 516, 518-19 (D. Del. 1974). Rule 15(a) provides that "a party may amend his plead-
ing by leave of court or by written consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be freely
given when justice so requires." FED. R. Civ. P. 15(a).
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behind the statute of limitations, which is to assure fairness to the
defendant' by compelling the commencement of an action against
the defendant within a reasonable time.5 Since the relation back
doctrine is necessarily intertwined with the statute of limitations,'
courts have considered the purposes of the statute of limitations
in determining whether to allow an amendment adding or chang-
ing a party to an action to relate back.7
' Burnett v. New York Cent. R.R., 380 U.S. 424, 428 (1965): American Pipe & Constr.
Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 554 (1974): see Developments in the Law - Statutes of Limitations,
63 HARv. L. REV. 1177, 1185 (1950).
The Supreme Court has frequently emphasized the purposes of the statutes of limitations
in the federal system. In Order of Railroad Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency Inc.,
321 U.S. 342, 348-49 (1944), the Court stated that the statutes of limitations are designed
-to promote justice by preventing surprises through the revival of claims." Id. The ration-
ale is that even if a party has a valid claim, fairness requires that the defendant receive
notice within the limitations period. Id.: see also Wood v. Carpenter, 101 U.S. 135, 139
(1879) (a bar to stale claims and protection against erosion of evidence).
" See Note, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c): Relation Back of Amendments, 57 MINN. L.
REV. 83, 84 (1972).
The statute of limitations will usually prevent a plaintiff from amending his complaint to
add a new party after the limitations period has run unless the amendment relates back to
the filing of the original complaint. Id. Reasons underlying the statute of limitations are (1)
to assure fairness to defendant by requiring that actions be commenced within a reasonable
time, (2) to avoid stale claims, (3) the unavailability of evidence or witnesses after a period
of time, (4) the possibility of faulty memory, and (5) a psychological end to possible litiga-
tion with respect to possible defendant. Id. When a court permits a plaintiff to amend the
complaint to add a party, after the statute expires, the court is technically violating the
statute of limitations. Id. However, Rule 15(c) tries to balance the conflicting policies un-
derlying the federal rules and the statute of limitations by allowing amendments only when
it will not prejudice the parties. Id.. see also FED. R. Civ. P. 15(c) advisory committee note,
39 F.R.D. 82 (1966) (in certain situations, policy of statute of limitations would not be
offended by allowing relation back).
Recent court decisions have been decided both ways when faced with the conflicting aims
of Rule 15(c) and the statute of limitations. Compare Itel Capital Corp. v. Cups Coal Co.,
707 F.2d 1253 (11 th Cir. 1983) (amendment adding owner of corporation as defendant
related back since he knew or should have known he would be named) and Hunt v. Broce
Constr. Co., 674 F.2d 834 (10th Cir. 1982) (amendment correcting name of corporate
defendant related back when summons had been served on corporate officers who were
charged with knowledge of action) with Norton v. International Harvester, 627 F.2d 18
(7th Cir. 1980) (amendment would not relate back when plaintiff could not claim he mis-
takenly failed to name defendant, where he was aware of its identity before suit was filed,
and waited 3 years to seek amendment).
' See FED. R. Civ. P. 15(c) advisory committee note, 39 F.R.D. 82 (1966) ("Relation back
is intimately connected with the policy of the statute of limitations"); J. MOORE, supra note
2, at 15.15121 (if original pleading gives fair notice, defendant will not be deprived of
protections of statute of limitations).
See Vargas v. McNamara, 608 F.2d 15 (1st Cir. 1979) (amendment permitted if just and
not prejudicial to adverse party.); Marks v. Prattco, Inc., 607 F.2d 1153 (5th Cir. 1979)
(amendment to substitute true corporate name allowed because defendant had notice of
action and was not prejudiced.): see also J. Mooa, supra note 2, at 1 15.15[2] (protection of
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
In federal court, an action is commenced upon the filing of a
complaint.6 A summons and complaint must then be served9
within 120 days of the original filing. 0 If the complaint is filed
within the statute of limitations period but the defendant is served
after the statute of limitations has expired, yet within the time al-
lowed for service, the action is still timely even though the de-
fendant did not receive actual notice of the action within the stat-
ute of limitations.1 The conflict occurs when the action is filed
within the statute of limitations period and the plaintiff seeks to
amend the complaint to change the party and the new party is
served after the statute of limitations has run but within the 120
day period allowed for service of process." The issue then be-
comes whether Rule 15(c) allows the amendment to relate back to
the original filing date. The courts of appeals have not taken a
unanimous approach to the interpretation of Rule 15(c)'s notice
provision." Recently, in Schiavone v. Fortune,4 the Supreme Court
statute of limitations does not include taking advantage of plaintiffs pleading mistakes).
8 FED. R. Civ. P. 3. Rule 3 provides that a civil action is commenced by "filing a com-
plaint with the court." Id.
In some jurisdictions, such as New York, state statute mandates that an action is com-
menced when the summons is served upon the defendant: the mere filing of the complaint
does not commence the action. N.Y. Civ. PRAc L. & R. § 203(b)(1) (McKinney 1972).
The Supreme Court has held that in a diversity action, the question of when an action is
"commenced" is governed by the forum state law rather than the Federal rules. See Walker
v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740 (1980).
9 FED. R. Civ. P. 4(a).
10 FED. R. Civ. P. 4(j). Federal Rule 4(j) provides in part:
If a service of the summons and complaint is not made upon a defendant within 120
days after the filing of the complaint and the party on whose behalf such service was
required cannot show good cause why such service was not made within that period,
the action shall be dismissed as to that defendant without prejudice upon the court's
own initiative with notice to such party or upon motion.
ld.
11 But set supra notes 8-10 and accompanying text. See generally Note, supra note 5, at
103-04 (action against defendant timely commenced by filing even though he may not have
notice until after the limitations period has elapsed).
" See, e.g., Cooper v. U.S. Postal Serv., 740 F.2d 714, 716 (9th Cir. 1984) (conflicting
interpretation on whether amended party may be served after the statute of limitations
period but within the 120 day period allowed for service), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 2034
(1985).
" Compare, e.g., Cooper v. U.S. Postal Serv., 740 F.2d 714, 717 (9th Cir. 1984) (amend-
ment substituting Postmaster General for United States Postal Service did not relate back
because Postmaster General did not receive notice of action within statutory period), cert.
denied, 471 U.S. 1022 (1985) and Watson v. Unipress, Inc., 733 F.2d 1386, 1390 (10th Cir.
1984) (amendment substituting corporation for "John Doe" defendant did not relate back
because corporation did not receive notice within the statutory period) and Hughes v.
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of the United States resolved the conflict by adopting a literal
construction of Rule 15(c).' 5
This article will discuss the policy considerations raised by
amendments that add a party and how the Schiavone decision re-
lates to these considerations. Part I will trace the history of Rule
15(c). Part II will discuss the Schiavone decision and the arguments
against it. Part III will discuss the possible ramifications of
Schiavone.
I. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF RULE 15(C)
At common law,'6 the courts allowed an amendment of a plead-
ing to relate back to the original filing date only if the new claim
arose from the identical "cause of action. 1 7 Gradually, the courts
United States, 701 F.2d 56, 58 (7th Cir. 1982) ("the period provided by law for commenc-
ing the action" does not include time allowed under the Federal Rules for service of pro-
cess) with Ringrose v. Engelberg Huller Co., 692 F.2d 403, 410 (6th Cir. 1982) (Jones, J.,
concurring) ("no reason to require more expeditious notice to an added party than it
would have had if it had been correctly named") and Kirk v. Cronvich, 629 F.2d 404, 408
(5th Cir. 1980) (period under Rule 15(c) within which party to be brought in must receive
notice of action includes reasonable time after filing of complaint for service of process)
and Ingram v. Kumar, 585 F.2d 566, 571-72 (2d Cir. 1978) (literal interpretation unjusti-
fied where timely service of process can be effected after statute of limitations has run since
even accurately named defendant may not receive actual notice prior to expiration of limi-
tations period), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 940 (1979).
The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari to clear up the conflict
among the circuit courts. See Schiavone v. Fortune, 106 S. Ct. 56 (1985).
" Schiavone v. Fortune, 106 S. Ct. 2379 (1986).
" See id. at 2385.
' See J. MOORE, supra note 2. at 1 15.15111; Bowles v. Pure Oil Co., 9 Fed. R. Serv.
(Callaghan) 341, 345 (E.D. Pa. 1946) (relation back doctrine existed long before adoption
of Rules of Civil Procedure, but Rule 15(c) broadened its application); see also Comment 7
U. CHI. L. REV. 733, 734 (1940) (where statute of limitations expired, courts may consider
policies of statute in determining whether amendment related back). See generally Note,
supra note 5, at 85 (discussion of relation back doctrine at common law).
" J. MOORE, supra note 2, at 1 15.15111.
Prior to the adoption of the Federal Rules, federal courts, whether of equity or of law,
allowed amendments to relate back to the initial filing only if the "cause of action" re-
mained the same. Id. If the court found that the amendment asserted a new cause of ac-
tion, relation back would not be allowed since it would violate the purpose of the statute of
limitations. See Union Pac. Ry. v. Wyler, 158 U.S. 285, 296-97 (1895) (amendment disal-
lowed because of change of legal theory and thus, held to be a new cause of action). But see
Missouri, Kansas & Texas Ry. Co. v. Wulf, 226 U.S. 570, 576 (1913) (plaintiff sued as
individual for son's death under one statute allowed to amend to sue as administratrix
under another statute even though statute of limitations expired). The major problem in-
volved the determination of whether a new cause of action was asserted. Ste generally Note,
supra note 5, at 85-94 (operation of relation back doctrine prior to 1966 amendment).
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
expanded this by allowing amendments to relate back under more
liberal circumstances.' 8 In 1938, the original Rule 15(c) was
adopted, 9 effectively broadening the application of the relation
back doctrine.' 0
Under both common law and the original Rule 15(c)", an
amendment substituting or adding a new party did not relate back
to the initial filing date because this would prejudice the new
party by defeating the purposes of the statute of limitations."
However, some courts recognized that in certain situations, when
it was clear that the party before the court was the party that the
plaintiff intended to sue initially, and this party was informed of
the action from the beginning, the amendment seeking to correct
the mere "misnomer" or "misdescription" of a defendant should
be allowed to relate back. 8
' See, e.g., New York Cent. & Hudson River R.R. v. Kinney, 260 U.S. 340, 346 (1922)
(where defendant has notice of plaintiffs claim from the beginning, reasons for statute of
limitations do not exist); United States v. Memphis Cotton Oil Co., 288 U.S. 62, 67-69
(1933) (court approved less restrictive view of relation back).
19 FED. R. Civ. P. 15(c) (1938). Original rule 15(c) stated "Whenever the claim or defense
asserted in the amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set
forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading, the amendment relates back to
the date of the original pleading." Id.
" See Note, supra note 5, at 83.
After Rule 15(c) was adopted in 1938, the test became whether or not the new matter
asserted by amendment arose out of the "conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or
attempted to be set forth in the original pleading." Id. Under Rule 15(c), courts examined
the "relevant facts of each case" rather than apply the conceptual cause of action standard.
Id. Rule 15(c) gave courts broad discretion in deciding whether an amendment should re-
late back. Id. at 88-89.
" See supra note 19.
I See United States ex rel Stratham Instruments, Inc. v. Western Casualty & Sur. Co.,
359 F.2d 521, 523 (6th Cir. 1966); Lewis v. Lewis, 358 F.2d 495, 502 (9th Cir. 1966);
James v. Dr. P. Phillips Co., 115 Fla. 472, 155 So. 661 (1934); J. MOORE, supra note 2, at
15.15[4.-11; J. FRIEDENTHAL, CIVIL PROCEDURE, § 5.26, at 306 (1985); R. LAVINE & G. HORN-
ING, MANUAL OF FEDERAL PRACTICE, § 3.61, at 267 (2d ed. 1979). But see United States v. A.
H. Fischer Lumber Co., 162 F.2d 872, 874 (4th Cir. 1947) (occasionally amendments may
be allowed "notwithstanding the running of the statute of limitations").
" See J. MOORE, supra note 2, at 15.1514.-Il; see also Travelers Ins. Co. v. Brown, 338
F.2d 229, 235 (5th Cir. 1964) (amendment to correct misnomer allowed to relate back);
Shapiro v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 274 F.2d 743, 746 (3d Cir. 1960) (amendment
to name Delaware corporation of same name who assumed liabilities of originally named
New York corporation allowed to relate back); Jackson v. Duke, 259 F.2d 3, 7 (5th Cir.
1958) (amendment to correct error in initials allowed after statute of limitations had run);
Grandey v. Pacific Indem. Co., 217 F.2d 27, 29 (5th Cir. 1954) (amendment to correct
misnomer allowed where no one misled by error). But see also Martz v. Miller Bros. Co.,
244 F. Supp. 246, 254 (D. Del. 1965) (amendment to add "of Newark" to Miller Brothers
Company did not relate back); Harris v. Stone, 115 F. Supp. 531 (D.D.C. 1953) (initial
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Another exception to the general rule occurred when the origi-
nally named party and the amended party had an "identity of in-
terest ' 24 such that allowing the amended complaint to relate back
would not be prejudicial to the new defendant."6 The underlying
rationale of this exception was that where the real parties in inter-
est were sufficiently alerted to the proceedings at the initial stage,
the statute of limitations should not prevent the claim. 6 Under
these exceptions, the courts' approach was to favor a decision on
the merits rather than a decision on pleading technicalities. 17
complaint named Mr. and Mrs. Augustus Stone, amended complaint correctly named J.
Austin Stone and Margaret Stone: court held amendment would not relate back).04 See R. LAVINE & G. HORNING, MANUAL OF FEDERAL PRACTICE, § 3.61, at 95 (1985
Supp.). "Identity of interest" has been described as follows:
The identity of interests principle provides that the institution of the action serves as
constructive notice of the action to the parties added after the expiration of the
limitations period, when the original and added parties are so closely related in busi-
ness or other activities that it is fair to presume the added parties learned of the
institution of the action shortly after it was commenced.
Id.
= See J. FRIEDENTHAI, CIVIL PROCEDURE, § 527, at 307 (1985) (amendment allowed where
identical corporations with interlocking directors operate as if they were one and plaintiff
sued wrong corporation); Note, supra note 5, at 91 (where parties closely related in their
business activities, institution of action against one is notice to other), see, e.g., Gifford v.
Wichita Falls & So. Ry. Co., 224 F.2d 374, 376-77 (5th Cir.) (amendment allowed to substi-
tute a company which had acquired all of original defendant company's assets), cert. denied,
350 U.S. 895 (1955). But see Cooper v. U.S. Postal Serv., 740 F.2d 714, 715 (9th Cir. 1984)(plaintiff not allowed to substitute Postmaster General for U.S. Postal Service), cert. denied,
105 S. Ct. 2034 (1985): Robbin v. Esso Shipping Co., 190 F. Supp. 880, 885 (S.D.N.Y.
1960) (amendment from F.sso Shipping Company to its owner Esso Standard Oil Company
not allowed).
Where one defendant was a corporate subsidiary of the other, courts generally were will-
ing to find an identity of interest. See, e.g., Travelers Indem. Co. v. United States ex r.
Construction Specialties Co., 382 F.2d 103, 106 (10th Cir. 1967) (wholly owned subsidiary
had identity of interest with parent company); Lackowitz v. Lummus Co., 189 F. Supp.
762, 763-64 (E.D. Pa. 1960) (amendment allowed where original defendant corporation
dissolved and assets transferred to substituted defendant corporation).
" See J. MOORE, supra note 2, at 1 15.15[4.-1J (where real parties in interest aware at
early stage, statute of limitations should not be used mechanically to bar claim); see also
Note, supra note 5, at 91 (where parties closely related in business activities, institution of
action against one is notice of litigation to other).
" See DeFranco v. United States, 18 F.R.D. 156, 160 (S.D. Cal. 1955). The DeFranco
court stated:
The primary function of the complaint is to notify the person against whom relief is
sought of the claim or cause of action asserted; thus where the "defendant has had
notice from the beginning that the plaintiff sets up and is trying to enforce a claim
against it because of specified conduct, the reasons for the statute of limitations do
not exist," . . . and an amendment should be allowed.
Id. (citation omitted).
Consistent with the spirit of the rules favoring a meritorious decision of a controversy,
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
While many courts permitted the relation back of amendments
changing parties, some courts still applied Rule 15(c) in a restric-
tive manner.2 s Thus, in 1966, Rule 15(c) was amended to clarify
when an amendment of a pleading changing a named party shall
relate back to the original filing date.'" The amended rule re-
quires that three conditions be satisfied before an amendment
changing a party will relate back to the original filing date.30 First,
the claim asserted in the amendment must arise out of the "con-
duct, transaction or occurrence" set forth in the original plead-
ing.- ' Second, the new defendant must receive notice of the litiga-
tion within the limitation period so that he is not prejudiced in
maintaining his defense on the merits.3 2 Finally, the new party
must have known that, but for a mistake concerning his identity,
the claim would have been brought against him originally.33
Despite the clarifying amendment, an interpretation problem
arose concerning the language of Rule 15(c)'s notice provision."
One view held that Rule 15(c) must be strictly applied and that
the language mandates that the amended party receive notice
within the statute of limitations period. 8 It is suggested that this
the courts have not hesitated to allow amendments where the moving party was acting in
good faith and the opposing party will not be unduly prejudiced. See J. MooRE, supra note
2, at 1 15.08121.
- See FED. R. Civ. P. 15(c), advisory committee's note; 39 F.R.D. 82, 83 (1966) ("incor-
rect criteria have sometimes been applied, leading sporadically to doubtful results"); see,
e.g., Martz v. Miller Bros. Co., 244 F. Supp. 246, 255 (D. Del. 1965) (amendment to name
second corporation as defendant did not relate back, even though both corporations had
overlapping officers); Murfkan v. Kahn, 1I F.R.D. 520, 522 (S.D. Fla. 1951) (amendment
to substitute widow of plaintiff not allowed to relate back); see generally J. MOORE, supra
note 2, at 115.1514.-21 (relation back was being misapplied in a number of cases).
" FED. R. Civ. P. 15(c), advisory committee's note; 39 F.R.D. 82, 82-84 (1966). The 1966
amendment was made to clarify "when an amendment of a pleading changing the party
against whom a claim is asserted (including an amendment to correct a misnomer or misde-
scription) shall 'relate back' to the date of the original pleading." Id.; see J. MOORE, Supra
note 2, at 1 15.1514.-21 (1966 amendment makes clear that amendments which change par-
ties relate back to the date of filing in certain situations); Note, supra note 5, at 96 ("The
Advisory Committee essentially combined the criteria used by some courts prior to 1966
and refined these to accommodate the policies of the statute of limitations."); see also supra
note 3 (amended version of Rule 15(c)).
FED. R. Civ. P. 15(c), advisory committee's note; 39 F.R.D. 82, 84 (1966).
" FED. R. Civ. P. 15(c).
n FED. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(1).
FED. R_ Civ. P. 15(c)(2).
U See supra notes 12-15 and accompanying text.
See Cooper v. U.S. Postal Serv., 740 F.2d 714 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct.
2034 (1985): Watson v. Unipress, Inc., 733 F.2d 1386 (10th Cir. 1984); Hughes v. United
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view effectively entitles an amended party to earlier notice than
the original party is entitled to.8 ' The opposing view advocates
that Rule 15(c) cannot be read literally to require that the
amended party have notice within the statute of limitations pe-
riod. 87 This position is premised on the belief that the original
party and the amended party are entitled to the same notice;
therefore, notice to the amended party is valid after the statute of
limitations period as long as it is still within the 120 day period
allowed for service of process."
II. THE Schiavone DECISION
The conflict concerning the proper interpretation of Rule 15(c)
was resolved by the Supreme Court in Schiavone v. Fortune.3 '
In Schiavone, the plaintiffs separately filed timely complaints in
federal court40 alleging libel, naming Fortune as the sole defend-
States, 701 F.2d 56 (7th Cir. 1982).
" See Ingram v. Kumar, 585 F.2d 566, 571 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 940
(1979).
" See Ringrose v. Engelberg Huller Co., 692 F.2d 403 (6th Cir. 1982); Kirk v. Cronvich,
629 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1980): Ingram v. Kumar, 585 F.2d 566 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
440 U.S. 940 (1979).
" See supra note 37.
" 106 S. Ct. 2379 (1986).
" Id. at 2381. Three plaintiffs instituted a diversity action, filing their respective com-
plaints in United States District Court for the District of New Jersey. Id.
In a diversity action, a federal court must apply the forum state's substantive law. Erie
R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). The Supreme Court has held that state statutes
of limitations govern in a diversity action and if, under state law, the statute of limitations
is tolled by service of process, then mere filing of the complaint is not sufficient. See Walker
v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740 (1980); Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse
Co., 337 U.S. 530 (1949). Some conflict exists, however, in whether state or federal rela-
tion back doctrine governs in a diversity case. See J. MoORE, supra note 2, at 1 15.1512].
Most courts have applied federal rule 15(c) either by employing the substance-procedure
analysis, established by Erie and its progeny, to conclude that rule 15(c) is procedural or by
simply assuming that rule 15(c) applies without any explicit consideration of state law. Id.;
see also Simmons v. Fenton, 480 F.2d 133 (7th Cir. 1973); Slack v. Treadway Inn, Inc., 388
F. Supp. 15 (M.D. Pa. 1974). But see Marshall v. Mulrenin, 508 F.2d 39 (1st Cir. 1974)
(Massachusetts rule applicable since state rule partially substantive); Rumberg v. Weber
Aircraft Corp., 424 F. Supp. 294, 298 (C.D. Cal. 1976) (California's Doe defendant rela-
tion back law substantive and therefore applicable). See generally Easton, Doe Defendants and
Other State Relation Back Doctrines in Federal Diversity Cases, 35 STAN. L. REv. 297 (1983)
(discussion of relation back doctrine in federal diversity cases). Many commentators have
agreed that Federal Rule 15(c) should be applied in diversity situations. See J. MoORE, supra
note 2, at 1 15.15121: C. WRIGr, LAW OF FEDFRAL COURTS 384 (4th ed. 1983).
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ant."' After the limitations period expired," but within the time
allowed for service, the plaintiffs attempted to serve Time, Inc.,
the corporate entity of which Fortune is merely a division.43 Time
refused service because the complaint did not name Time as a de-
fendant."' Subsequently, but still within the time period allowed
for service, the complaint was amended and service accepted by
Time."' Time moved to dismiss the amended complaints, claiming
that it could not be named as a party after the statute of limita-
tions period had expired.46 The district court granted Time's mo-
tions and dismissed the claims.'" The court of appeals affirmed the
judgment of the district court," finding Rule 15(c) to be "clear
and unequivocal" in requiring notice to the defendant within the
statutory period.'" Furthermore, the court held that the statutory
period does not include the time provided under the federal rules
for service of process.' 0
The Supreme Court of the United States granted Schiavone's
" Schiavone, 106 S. Ct. at 2381. Plaintiffs' complaints alleged that they were libeled in a
story which appeared in the May 31, 1983, issue of Fortune magazine. Id. The complaints
each named Fortune as the sole defendant, even though Fortune is only a division of Time,
Incorporated, a New York corporation. Id. The three individual actions were consolidated
on appeal. Id. at 2382.
" Id. at 2381-82. Under New Jersey law, a libel action must be commenced within one
year from publication of the alleged libel, running from the date of substantial distribution.
See N.J. STAT. ANN. 2A: 14-3 (West 1952). The court of appeals determined that the statute
of limitations ended on May 19, 1983. Schiavone, 106 S. Ct. at 2382.
4' Schiavone, 106 S. Ct. at 2381. On May 20, 1983, plaintiffs mailed the complaints to
Time's registered agent in New Jersey and they were received on May 23, 1983. Id.
"Id.
Id. On July 19, 1983, plaintiffs amended their complaints to name as defendant "For-
tune, also known as Time, Incorporated." Id. On July 21, 1983, the amended complaints
were successfully served by certified mail on Time. Id.
" Id. at 2381-82. Time took the position that in order for the amendment to relate back
to the original filing date, a party must be substituted within the limitations period. Id. at
2382.
41 Id. at 2381. In granting Time's motions to dismiss, the district court concluded that
the amendments to the complaints did not relate back to the filing of the original com-
plaints because it had not been shown that Time received notice of the institution of the
actions within the period provided by law for commencing an action against it. Id. at 2381-
82.
" Schiavone v. Fortune, 750 F.2d 15 (3d Cir. 1984), afd, 106 S. Ct. 2379 (1986).
19 Id. at 18. In affirming, the court of appeals stated that while they were sympathetic to
plaintiffs' pursuasive policy argument, they found the language of Rule 15(c) to be disposi-
tive. Id. Further, the court felt that it was not their role "to amend procedural rules in
accordance with our own policy preferences." Id.
Id.
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petition for writ of certiorari1 and affirmed," stating that under
Rule 15(c), relation back is dependent on satisfying four require-
ments.53 First, the claim must have arisen from the conduct set
forth in the original pleading; second, the added party must have
received notice so that the party will not be prejudiced in main-
taining his defense; third, the added party should have known
that, but for a mistake concerning identity, the action would have
been brought against it; and finally, the second and third require-
ments must have occurred before the statute of limitations ex-
pired." The Court concluded that Time did not have the re-
quired notice "within the period provided by law for commencing
the action" and thus petitioners were precluded from bringing the
action against Time."
A three-justice dissent" maintained that Rule 15(c) does not ap-
ply "unless the amendment is one changing the party against
whom a claim is asserted"' 7 and in the instant case, the amend-
ment added nothing to either party's understanding of whom the
claim was against." Additionally, Justice Stevens stated that even
s1 Schiavone v. Fortune, 106 S. Ct. 56 (1985).
s2 Schiavone v. Fortune, 106 S. Ct. 2379, 2386 (1986).
" Id. at 2384.
" Id.
" Id. at 2385 (quoting Rule 15(c)). The Court found that Time first learned about the
institution of the suits after May 19, 1983, the date the statute of limitations ran. Id. at
2384. Time's registered agent did not receive the original complaints until May 23, 1983,
at which time the agent refused acceptance. Id. at 2384-85. Then on July 19, 1983, the
plaintiffs amended their complaints and on July 21, 1983, the amended complaints were
served on 'rime. Id.: see supra note 45. The Court held that the Rule 15(c) requirements of
knowledge and notice did not occur "within the period provided by law for commencing
the action against" 'rime. Id.
" Id. at 2386 (Stevens, J., joined by Burger, C.J., and White, J., dissenting).
" Id. at 2387. Justice Stevens stated that the majority ignored the "critical antecedent
point" that the four pronged test of Rule 15(c) is "utterly irrelevent unless the amendment
is one 'changing the party against whom a claim is asserted.'" Id.
" Id. Justice Stevens stated that in the instant case, there was merely a "technical correc-
tion" which "added absolutely nothing to any party's understanding of 'the party against
whom' the claims were against." Id. He felt that Time understood that the claim was aimed
at them. Id. This was indicated by a letter written by Time's agent the day the agent re-
ceived the original summons and complaints. Id. The cover letter, which was sent to Time's
law department along with the summons and complaints, stated, "Discrepancy in corporate
title noted. Letter from attorney indicates papers are for Time, Incorporated as publisher
of Fortune. Service was made by mail pursuant to Rule 4(c) of FRCP." Id. Justice Stevens
felt that the difference between the description of the publisher of Fortune in the original
complaints and the description of the publisher of Fortune in the amended complaints was
insignificant. Id. at 2388.
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if he agreed that there was a change of parties, and Rule 15(c)
applied, he would still disagree with the majority's interpretation
of the rule.59 Under his analysis, "the period provided by law for
commencing the action" includes two components: the time for
commencing by filing a complaint and the time in which the ac-
tion must be implemented by service of process. 60
After Schiavone, it is clear that Rule 15(c) requires that the
amended defendant receive notice within the limitations period,"
even though in any given case the original defendant may not re-
ceive notice until after the statute of limitations expired." While
the Court purported to recognize the plain language of Rule
15(c)," it is submitted that the Court failed to adequately consider
the purpose and the history of the rule in reaching its decision."
The paramount goal of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is
to facilitate the disposition of litigation on the merits rather than
on mere technicalities." Consistent with this goal, the aim of Rule
15(c) is to protect parties not named in the original pleading only
if prejudice will result when they are subsequently brought in by
amendment." Additionally, the Supreme Court has long rejected
the approach "that pleading is a game of skill in which one mis-
step may be decisive." 67 Yet the Schiavone Court held that by vir-
tue of the fact that in the original complaint, the plaintiffs named
"Fortune" as defendant, instead of "Fortune, also known as
s Id. at 2388. Justice Stevens stated that even if he agreed that there was a change of
parties and Rule 15(c) applied, he still found the "majority's plain language analysis unper-
suasive." Id.
"Id.
11 Id. at 2385.
" See supra notes 8-11. See generally Note, supra note 5, at 103 (in jurisdictions where
filing complaint tolls statute of limitations, action against defendant will be timely com-
menced by filing even though he may not have actual notice of suit until after statute of
limitations expired).
See Schiavone v. Fortune, 106 S. Ct. at 2385.
See supra notes 16-38 and accompanying text.
See J. MOORE, supra note 2, at 15.08[21; see also Davis v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 615
F.2d 606, 613 (4th Cir.) (federal rules designed to adjudicate actions on merits, not on
technical aspects of pleading), cert. denied, 448 U.S. 9 11 (1980).
See supra notes 16-38 and accompanying text.
See Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 181 (1962). "It is too late in the day and entirely
contrary to the spirit of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for decisions on the merits to
be avoided on the basis of such mere technicalities." Id.; Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 48
(1957).
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Time, Incorporated," Time is entitled to have known about the
action prior to the end of the limitations period. 8 It is submitted
that the Schiavone Court undermined the goal of a decision on the
merits by unduly restricting the applicability of Rule 15(c) in a
situation where allowing the amendment would not have
prejudiced the defendant in any way. In Schiavone, the original
defendant and the amended defendant were the same party."
The same agent for Time was served each time and the agent was
fully aware that the initial service was aimed at Time. 1 Time
would not have received notice any earlier had it been named cor-
rectly in the initial complaint and unquestionably, the action
would have been timely.72 Time would not have been prejudiced
by the allowance of the amendment and therefore, should not
have been entitled to the protections of the statute of
limitations."8
Furthermore, it is suggested that the restrictive interpretation
of the notice requirement reached in Schiavone was unnecessary
and unjust in light of the history and purpose of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure in general and Rule 15(c) in particular.7' In
" Schiavone, 106 S. Ct. at 2385. The Supreme Court held that Time could not be added
as a party after the statute of limitations period expired. Id.
" See id. at 2387 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The obvious purpose of Rule 15(c) is to protect
parties from prejudice when they are added as defendants. Id. When "the identification of
the defendant is so inaccurate or ambiguous that a reading of the complaint itself would
not enable the defendant himself to realize that he was the party being sued," there is a
risk of prejudice. Id. at 2388. "By any standard of fair notice, the difference between the
description of the publisher of Fortune in the original complaints and the description of
the publisher of Fortune in the amended complaints is no more significant than a misspell-
ing ... ." Id.
TO See id. at 2381. Fortune is the name of an internal division of Time, Incorporated. Id.
In his dissent, Justice Stevens stated that Rule 15(c) did not even apply because this was not
an amendment "changing the party." Id. at 2388.
" See Schiavone, 106 S. Ct. at 2381. The initial complaints were mailed to Time's regis-
tered agent in New Jersey on May 20, 1983 and the amended complaints served on Time's
registered agent on July 21, 1983. Id. "There is no, and has never been any, suggestion
that the caption confused or misled any agent of the defendant." Id. at 2387 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). On the day the agent received the initial complaint, the agent notified Time of
receipt and that the service was for Time, Incorporated as publisher for Fortune. Id.
" See supra notes 8-11 and accompanying text: Schiavone, 106 S. Ct. at 2387 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
73 See supra notes 69-72; Schiavone, 106 S. Ct. at 2387 (Stevens, J., dissenting). There is
no suggestion that the amendment from "Fortune" to "Fortune, also known as Time, In-
corporated" could have caused Time, Incorporated any prejudice in maintaining its de-
fense on the merits. Schiavone, 106 S. Ct. at 2387.
'4 See supra notes 1-3, 16-38 and accompanying text.
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Schiavone, the threshold question centered on the interpretation
of the requirement that the new defendant receive notice within
the limitation period so that he is not prejudiced in maintaining
his defense on the merits .7 The majority interpreted the require-
ment to mean that the amended party must have had notice
before the statute of limitations period expired even though the
original defendant may have received timely notice up to 120 days
after the statutory period .7  The majority's view effectively enti-
tles an amended defendant to earlier notice than the original de-
fendant under the identical circumstances.7 It is suggested that
this interpretation runs contrary to the spirit of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure. 7 ' Rule 1 provides that "these rules . . .shall
be construed to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determi-
nation of every action." 7' Rule 8(f) provides that "[a]ll pleadings
shall be so construed as to do substantial justice."'" In addition,
Rule 15(a) declares that leave to amend "shall be freely given
when justice so requires."81 The Supreme Court has consistently
favored a determination on the merits whenever possible.82 De-
spite these mandates, the Schiavone Court disposes of the instant
case by strictly construing the notice requirement of Rule 15(c),
thereby precluding a decision on the merits.8"
III. RULE 15(c) AFTER SCHiAVONE V. FORTUNE
As a result of the Schiavone decision, only timely filing and no-
" See Schiavone, 106 S. Ct. at 2384.
" See id. at 2385.
"See supra note II and accompanying text.
"See supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text.
"FED. R. Civ. P. 1.
FED. R. Civ. P. 8(f).
FED. R. Civ. P. 15(a).
u See supra note 67.
' See Schiavone, 106 S. Ct. at 2385. "Despite these worthy goals and loftily stated pur-
poses," the Schiavone Court held that the plain language of Rule 15(c) required the
amended party to be notified within the statute of limitations period. Id. at 2385. The
Court noted that there was "an element of arbitrariness" in its decision, but found solace
in the fact that it was an "arbitrariness imposed by the legislature and not by the judicial
process." Id.; But see Schiavone, 106 S. Ct. at 2390 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens
could not understand the Court's "willingness to aggravate, rather than alleviate, that arbi-
trariness, particularly when the decision to do so is demonstrably at odds with the lan-
guage, purpose and history of the Rule." Id.
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tice to the original defendant within the limitations period will
permit imputation of notice to a subsequently named and suffi-
ciently related party." Therefore, to have any chance of relation
back at all, the original defendant must have been served with no-
tice before the statutory period expired.8 The purpose of Rule
15(c) is to allow a plaintiff to amend an error in his complaint
after the limitations period has run if the amendment will not
prejudice the new party." Thus, the utility of the rule is signifi-
cantly limited if it requires that the amendment be made before
the statutory period has run since the plaintiff could easily com-
mence another action against the correct defendant.8 7
Hopefully, the Court's strict interpretation of Rule 15(c) is lim-
ited to the particular facts of Schiavone and is only an isolated de-
parture from the rule of liberal construction mandated by the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure."
In light of the goal of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
favoring a decision on the merits and the inconsistent conse-
quences of the Schiavone Court's interpretation of Rule 15(c),8 ' it
is suggested that an amendment to Rule 15(c) is warranted." By
amending Rule 15(c) to include the words "and serving him with
notice of the action" after "within the period provided by law for
"See Schiavone, 106 S. Ct. at 2384. The majority found that "neither Fortune nor Time
received notice of the filing until after" the limitations period. Id. As a result, "there was
no proper notice to Fortune that could be imputed to Time." Id.
" See id.
" See id. at 2389 (Stevens, J., dissenting). If the purpose of Rule 15(c) is to allow a plead-
ing to be amended after the statute of limitations period as long as the new party will not
be prejudiced, that purpose is defeated if it is construed to require that the amendment be
made before the limitation has run, since the plaintiff can institute a new action against the
correct defendant without the need for relation back. Id. "[T]he Rule becomes largely
superfluous." Id.; see also Martz v. Miller Bros. Co., 244 F. Supp. 246, 254 n.21 (D. Del.
1965) (language of Rule 15(c) might be possible oversight). "Query whether this inconsis-
tency in the [then] proposed Rule 15(c) would not frequently defeat the purposes which the
change was intended to serve." Schiavone, 106 S. Ct. at 2384.
" See supra note 86.
" See Schiavone, 106 S. Ct. at 2386 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens stated that
the majority's decision represents an aberrational and, hopefully "isolated return to the
'sporting theory of justice' condemned . . . 80 years ago." Id.
" See supra notes 69-83 and accompanying text.
90 See Martz v. Miller Bros. Co., 244 F. Supp. 246, 254 n.21 (D. Del. 1965). In Martz, the
court suggested that the words "and serving him with notice of the action" could be added
to Rule 15(c) after "within the period provided by law for commencing the action against
him," to extend the time within which the new defendant could receive notice to include
the time allowed under the federal rules for service. Id.; see also Note, supra note 5, at 105.
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commencing the action against him," this would include the time
allowed under the federal rules for service of process during
which the proposed defendant could receive notice.9' Such an
amendment would correct the defect which resulted from the
Schiavone Court's interpretation of the current Rule 15(c) lan-
guage, while avoiding the risk of prejudice to the amended
defendant."
CONCLUSION
By adopting the strict interpretation of Rule 15(c), the Supreme
Court of the United States has significantly limited the utility of
the rule in violation of the spirit and intent of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure which favors a liberal application to promote a
decision on the merits. Further, the Court's interpretation will al-
low an amended defendant to successfully plead the statute Of lim-
itations in situations where he has not been prejudiced in any way.
Consequently, to remedy the unjust ramifications of the majority's
ruling, an amendment to Rule 15(c) is suggested.
Ken C. Chin
' See supra note 89.
See supra note 89; see, e.g., Ingram v. Kumar, 585 F.2d 566, 571 (2d Cir. 1978), crt.
denied, 440 U.S. 940 (1979). In jurisdictions where timely service can be effected after the
statute of limitations has run, an accurately named defendant may not receive notice of the
action prior to the end of the limitations period, yet the action is timely against him..Id.
There is no reason why an amended defendant is entitled to earlier notice than the origi-
nally named defendant. Id.
